Here’s the plan:
For my final project, I decided to read a book, write a paper, and hold a lesson. For my submission, I am handing in this document and a scanned chapter of the Scruton book, which includes some annotations that I made. The scanned chapter is relevant to the paper that I wrote, and I wanted both to practice my close reading skills and to give you a copy of relevant text, so you can see if my interpretive work is solid or not. Another part of my work was the preparation for and sharing of my in-class presentation.
A big drive behind picking a philosophy paper to do as my final project was to give myself a space to practice my philosophical reading, writing, and teaching skills that I continue to work on. Reading the Scruton book was one of my first experiences tackling a larger philosophical text, so that was important and formative for me. I feel less intimidated going forwards, because I feel like my strategy of close reading helped me glean some of the important pieces of Scruton’s philosophy. Also, I treated my paper not only as a philosophy paper, but as an analysis paper of Scruton’s book and his own paper. Some of the commentary, especially towards the end, gets a bit removed from my philosophical ideas about the Scruton. In my paper, I did some experimentation with new styles and ideas, and I wanted to see how it turned out. A big part of philosophical writing that I find that I struggle with is figuring out how to edit stuff down. I feel like I always end up with more explanation than I need to; though, I think that may stem from a strong desire not to understate my ideas. I find it incredibly frustrating when some writers make their ideas ambiguous within the papers, even when it’s an accident. With that said, I gave the paper my best effort. I hope that you treat my project to write the paper both as an endeavor to learn to write better and as an exploration of the Scruton, beyond what we did in class. Last, I wanted to treat my presentation in class as an opportunity to do some first-time work trying to teach some philosophy. I liked it a lot! I hope to have more experiences like that going forward, and I’m excited to see where my time here at the UVM philosophy department will bring me.
In my paper, I have 4 sections. The first one aims to interpret the chapter that I printed out, but it also includes information from other parts of the book. The second part of my paper aims to talk about Scruton’s argument for the permissibility of slaughtering young farm animals in the way that we formulated it in class. I also introduce one of my problems with Scruton’s argument in the second section of my paper. The third part looks at how Scruton’s argument for farm animal slaughter seems to work in the book. The last part of my paper aims to share a reaction that I had while reading the Scruton book.
With that said, onto the paper. Enjoy!
Scruton first lays out his foundational moral principles.
Scruton, in Animal Rights and Wrongs, outlines the “roots for moral thinking.” Scruton believes that four foundational principles in moral thinking can factor in when we make decision about morality. These principles are the moral law, virtue, sympathy, and piety. In cases where humans interact with moral agents, beings to whom rights and obligations are ascribed, then the moral law must be adhered to first. Since Scruton spends the first half of his book arguing that Animals are not moral agents, and since, for the sake of this paper, not interested in thinking about moral agents, I won’t spend any time here describing agency and moral law.
In cases where humans interact with non-moral agents, like animals, Scruton thinks that the other three foundational principles in moral thinking take over. When we interact with an animal, first, we must always be virtuous. In order to be virtuous, we must seek to emulate the character of a supremely courageous, just, prudent, wise, and tempered figure, a figure that exhibits the “traditional ‘cardinal’ virtues.” Think Jesus. In Scruton’s view, to be virtuous, we ask ourselves, “how would Jesus feel about this situation?” The way that we answer this question informs us on what sort of mindset and approach we should have to any given situation. Once we are acting, using Jesus’s set of virtues as an ethical guide, Scruton thinks that we have been primed to deploy our sympathy.
Scruton thinks that sympathy is a foundational moral principle that speaks with “a utilitarian accent,” meaning when we sympathize with some animal, then we think about how to maximize its pleasure and minimize its pain. In sympathizing with an animal, let's say Gerald the Elephant, we consider what actions maximize Gerald’s pleasure and which actions minimize Gerald’s pain. In order to make sure that we are deploying sympathy in the correct way, meaning to the correct animals and people and in the correct amounts, virtue informs our sympathy; virtuous character primes us to know when it’s correct to deploy sympathy and in what amounts. So, before deploying our sympathy to tell us how to interact with Gerald, we first ask ourselves, “how would Jesus feel about this situation?” If it turns out that Jesus would make sure that he cares for Gerald, then we would be constrained to care for Gerald as we engage our sympathy. The last foundational moral principle, piety, counterbalances our sympathy.
Piety, according to Scruton, requires that we appreciate the relationship that animals have with the world at large. Importantly, Scruton does not use piety in the typical “revering God” sense, but in a sense that aims to respect the place that all beings have in the world. For instance, when sympathy says that we ought to kill an animal, to put it out of its misery, piety may say that the animal has a special place in the world and it cannot be replaced, so we should not take the animal out of the world if it can be avoided. It may be the case that sympathy wins out over piety, or that piety wins out over sympathy; we decide what is moral on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with virtue, Scruton says. So, whatever verdict we come to, it will and should be premised on what is virtuous.
Scruton proceeds to not follow his own guidelines.
Roger Scruton, in “Eating our friends,” argues that it is permissible to kill farm animals, raised on free range farms. According to Scruton’s moral ethics as described in the previous section, determining actions are right and wrong hinge on determining how a supremely virtuous person, Jesus, would feel, and then by determining how Jesus would deploy his principles of sympathy and piety.
In the case of dealing with farm animals, Scruton thinks that the relevant virtue is the virtue to care for those farm animals. Scruton thinks that when we farm animals, we place ourselves in a relationship with those animals that creates for us the responsibility to care for those animals. When Old McDonald started his farm and purchased his first animals, he created a new relationship that had not existed prior. In this relationship, he became the owner and the new farm animals became the owned. McDonald has caused these animals to depend on him alone to supply their food, their water, their shelter—all elements necessary to sustain that animal’s life. Additionally, McDonald has caused his animals to depend on him alone to keep sickness, pain, and suffering at bay. Where in the case of wild animals, no human has taken on the responsibility to care for it, farmers automatically take on the duty to care for their animals, according to Scruton.
For Scruton, an action done unto a farm animal is right iff the actor fulfills her duty to care for the animal. So, in arguing for a conclusion about the permissibility of engaging in some action unto a farm animal, it makes intuitive sense that Scruton would want to demonstrate how the person engaging in that action fulfills her duty to care for the animal. Otherwise, Scruton ends up with an unintuitive argument that fails to put into action the first half of his book, where he describes and motivates his foundational moral principles. Scruton also leaves himself vulnerable to criticisms that point out that his foundational moral principles are inconsistent with his convictions about the permissibility of killing farm animals.
In class, we formulated Scruton’s argument in a way similar to the argument that follows:
P1) There is nothing bad about late animal death.
P2) There is nothing worse about early animal death than late animal death; therefore,
C1) there is nothing bad about early animal death.
P3) There is nothing wrong with bringing about states of affairs where nothing is bad; therefore,
C2) there is nothing wrong with bringing about early animal death
P4) an action done unto a farm animal by a farmer is wrong iff it is uncaring; therefore,
C3) There is nothing uncaring about killing young animals.
In this formulation of Scruton’s argument, the first premise states that there is nothing bad about animal death in old age, but nowhere in his book nor in his paper does Scruton put forth a justification for why there is nothing bad about animal death in old age. Insofar as death is bad for anyone or any animal, death is bad, it seems like death is bad for old animals. I can’t think of any reason why necessarily an animal dying in old age would be any better for that animal than a human dying in old age. For the sake of this paper, I will set aside this issue, and take P1 as a given.
Premise 2 of the argument claims that there is nothing worse about early animal death than late animal death. Scruton supports this claim by talking about the rational capability of animals. Scruton thinks that what makes early human death worse than late human death is the loss of opportunity that young people experience when they die. When a young person dies, they lose out on the chance to explore life to the fullest, pursue goals, and live a transformative life. An old person doesn’t lose out on this chance in the same way, since they have already lived their life and no longer have this chance. An animal, similar to an old person, doesn’t lose out on this chance. It is no worse for a cow to die young than it is for that cow to die old, because the animal is dead either way and the animal lacks the potential to achieve long-term goals that humans possess. A cow cannot dream of becoming a firefighter, or hope to one day win the Pulitzer Prize in Literature. A cow doesn’t have any goals apart from finding grass to eat and sleeping. We may be sad when a young animal dies, but it’s not sadness that results the fact that the animal has lost the opportunity to achieve long-term goals in its life. So, Scruton thinks, that early animal death is no worse than late animal death.
Scruton’s third premise, there is nothing wrong with bringing about states of affairs where nothing is bad, is also something that goes unjustified in his book and paper. It makes sense to ascribe this view to Scruton because he talks about death in his paper, which is a state rather than an action. Scruton also then talks about how killing farm animals is permissible, which is an action rather than a state. So, Scruton needs a premise like premise three, that explains how it’s permissible to bring about a state of affairs where nothing is wrong. Otherwise, there is nothing that brings Scruton from his premises about the state of death to his conclusion about the permissibility of killing young farm animals.
I also have some problems with this premise; I think that there are counter-example cases that demonstrate how there is something wrong with bringing about certain states of affairs where nothing is bad. I think that the case of killing an animal is a counter-example case itself. However, for this paper, I will set that issue aside.
Lastly, premise four is merely the commitment that goes along with Scruton’s view on foundational moral principles, that I explained in the last section. Notice that in Scruton’s argument, premise four is the last premise, and Scruton uses it to conclude that there is nothing uncaring about killing farm animals from the prior conclusion that there is nothing wrong with killing farm animals. Given that Scruton spent the whole first part of his book explaining his foundational moral principles, wouldn’t it make sense for Scruton to argue from the fact that there is nothing uncaring about an action to the fact that there is nothing wrong with an action? Scruton talks about our duty to care for farm animals in “Eating our friends.” Scruton acknowledges his commitment to virtue ethics within that paper. Scruton’s whole book and paper are framed with virtue ethics at the onset, and with an argument that largely has nothing to do with virtue ethics in the middle. By relying on premises that have nothing to do with our duty to care in order to conclude that there is nothing wrong with killing farm animals and then concluding that there is nothing uncaring about it, Scruton follows the path of most resistance. Scruton should be reasoning the other way around. It makes more sense to first show that some action is caring before determining that there is nothing wrong with it.
Scruton also leaves himself open to particularly imposing form of criticism by separating his thoughts on foundational moral principles from his actual argument on the permissibility of killing farm animals. If the reader can show that killing farm animals violates our duty to care for those farm animals, then Scruton has to face the fact that his argument is inconsistent with this how picture of normative ethics that he committed to from the beginning. For the sake of this paper, I won’t take up this project. That said, the problem that I’m identifying could be problematic for Scruton.
My suggestion to Scruton is that he should move his thoughts on the ethics of slaughtering animals to a different spot. He should (or should have, while he was alive) written a different paper where he explores ideas on why he thinks it’s permissible to slaughter animals. Since the moral considerations that bear on the permissibility of the slaughtering of animals presented by Scruton in his argument have nothing to do with virtue ethics or our duty to care for farm animals, then he should (have) separate(d) his body of work such that there are clearer lines between the places where he is making virtue ethics arguments and the places where he is considering different sorts of moral considerations.
How Scruton’s argument(s) actually seem to be working, and where they go wrong.
With all that said, I think that the way that we formulated the argument that Scruton gives in class misses the mark a little bit. Scruton, whenever he talks about animal slaughter on farms, he takes the fact that animals will be slaughtered as a given. Consider the following excerpt:
Two questions trouble the ordinary conscience, however. First, under what conditions should farm animals be raised? Secondly, at what age ought they be killed? Both questions are inevitably bound up with economics, since the animal in question would not exist at all if they could not be sold profitably as food.
In this passage, Scruton takes it as a given that some animals that we raise on farms are going to be need to be killed at some point, necessarily. Some farm animals only exist to be slaughtered, turned into meat and other products, and sold. If this sort of animal is going to exist on a farm, it must be necessary to slaughter it at some point. After all, it’s a part of the essence of being this sort of animal that it will be slaughtered during its lifetime, except in the cases of accidents and other peculiar exceptions.
It seems like the conversation about slaughtering farm animals with the Scruton from this book goes like this:
Socrates: Is it permissible to slaughter animals when they’re young?
Scruton: Yes, since there is nothing worse about young animal death than old animal death. Animals to the slaughter only exist to be killed, and so, since the death is inevitable, since there is nothing impermissible about bringing about a state of affairs that is no worse than another permissible state of affairs, and since early animal death is no worse than late animal death, then killing animals in their youth is permissible.
Socrates: That may be so, but I wonder… is it permissible to cast certain animals as animals for the slaughter?
Scruton: It’s not a question of permissibility; farm animals that are bred and raised to be sold on the market as meats and leather and other products must die at some point, since we are committed to selling their products. We must kill them at some point, and if early deaths for animals are no worse than late deaths, then we might as well kill the animals when it is most economically viable.
Socrates: But that’s not the question, Sir; you misunderstand me. Is it permissible to own farm animals that you already know that you will be killing?
I hope that this dialogue has made clear my objection: Scruton spends a lot of time in his paper and book either talking about how animals to the slaughter are meant to die since that is what is economically required for the farmer or how it must be permissible to slaughter animals. However, Scruton doesn’t ever justify either of the two beliefs beyond talking about the economic requirements of farming. If someone were to object to Scruton, saying that we shouldn’t own animals destined to be slaughtered in the first place, that just owning these animals and destining them to be killed in the first place is wrong, then Scruton would have no response in his book. As a result, Scruton never really answers the question of why we have the moral go-ahead on slaughtering animals; Scruton merely explains the material requirements that farming animals destined to be slaughtered places on the farmer.
Additionally, Scruton has a separate argument, with separate ideas about how there is nothing worse about early animal death than late animal death and how some animals are destined to be slaughtered, so they will be killed either now or later. Scruton uses these premises to conclude that slaughtering animals while they are young is permissible. Why is this a separate argument? It relies on the conclusion of the first argument, about economics, as a premise in this argument. With that said, it shares the same problem with the first argument, in that it fails to consider that it may be impermissible to own farm animals an destine them to be slaughtered in the first place.
Another interesting thing about this reading of Scruton, as having two separate arguments, is that Scruton still fails to include or mention virtue ethics or our duty to care for animals in this formulation. Why doesn’t Scruton write anything about the virtue ethics when he talks about slaughtering animals? What was the point of the whole first half of the book when Scruton refuses to use foundational moral principles in any argument that has to do with slaughtering animals? It still doesn’t make sense. Consequently, Scruton faces the same pushback that I gave in my second section. My advice remains the same. Scruton should separate his work into two volumes: one that talks about cases where there are relevant duties that stem from our foundational moral principles that inform us on which actions done unto animals are permissible and which are not, and another that talks about morally relevant considerations that bear on which actions done unto animals are permissible and which are not.
Thing that I learned about Scruton from the book.
Why do Scruton’s arguments appear in completely different parts of the book? His main ideas about the economic inevitability of animal slaughter on farms show up right in the middle of the book, while his argument about young animal death is resigned to the appendices in the back. “Why does Scruton do this?”, I kept asking myself. “Why did he make this choice in his formatting?” “Why, Why, Why?”
I realized that Roger Scruton is a bad writer. The thing that I learned about Scruton from the book is that he is a bad writer. The subtitle of this section of my paper is “Thing that I learned about Scruton from the book.” The thing that I learned about Scruton from the book is that he is a bad writer. This is how I choose to end my paper. Seriously, though, he makes some pretty big mistakes in his argumentation, and I think that a lot of those mistakes can be corrected for if he just clarified his arguments and used better formatting. So, as much as this is a joke, that I’m ridiculing the writing style of esteemed conservative British public philosopher Sir Roger Scruton, I am making the meaningful point that writing style matters.
I think that Roger Scruton could have benefitted from taking the UVM philosophy reading and writing course! An important goal in philosophy is simplifying your structure so that your ideas come through clearer, and it only makes sense to format your arguments in ways where the premises are not left implied, but are carefully stated and explained. Additionally, it’s important to format larger works with arguments that relate to each other located closely together within the text. If I have an argument that relies on ideas from a previous argument, it makes sense to put them in nearby parts of my book, so the reader can build off of the ideas from the first argument right alongside me in a timely manner. All in all, Scruton’s writing leaves much to be desired in the way of both format and ideas, as I have so carefully and cordially discussed in my paper.